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A Small Step Forward: The Impact of Tokyo
Round Concessions on U.S. Tobacco
When the U.S. Senate ratified the "Agreements Reached in the To-
kyo Round of the Multilateral Trade Negotiations" in July 1979,' the
United States had won some long-sought tariff and nontariff concessions
for the agricultural sector of the U.S. economy. The concessions relating
to U.S. tobacco exports negotiated with the European Community (EC)
and other trading partners are of particular importance to the economy
of North Carolina. 2 Although reductions in foreign tariff rates as a result
of the negotiations should make U.S. tobacco more competitive, the con-
cessions are not expected to lead to any gains in the U.S. share of the
world market. At best, the concessions may only halt the steady, fifteen-
year decline in the U.S. share of the world tobacco market. 3 However,
while the Tokyo Round gains may have come too late to reverse the U.S.
market share decline, at least the removal of tariff barriers from the list of
causes of this decline will force farmers, exporters and those with political
authority to focus closer attention on other critical issues involved in the
export of U.S. tobacco.
I. U.S. Tobacco Trade on World Markets
For many years the United States has been the largest producer and
exporter of unmanufactured tobacco in the world. 4 While several types
of cigarette leaf are traded, flue-cured tobacco accounts for over eighty
percent of the total U.S. unmanufactured exports. This is the principal
tobacco produced in North Carolina, the largest producer and exporter
of tobacco in the nation. 5 Even though during 1976 and 1977 the United
I Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39 (to be codified in scattered sections of
19, 26 U.S.C.). For legislative history and purpose, see S. REP. No. 96-249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.,
reprinted in [1979] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 381.
2 In 1977, the last year for which complete statistics are available, North Carolina ex-
ported $550 million in new leaf tobacco, representing approximately sixty percent of the state's
total agricultural exports. U.S. DEP'T" OF COMMERCE, NORTH CAROLINA EXPORTS 3, 10
(1979). Further, exports of manufactured tobacco products totalled $484 million in 1976, also
the last year for which complete statistics are available, or almost twelve percent of the state's
total production of manufactured goods. Id. at 4.
3 STAFF OF SENATE SUBCOMM1TrEE ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE, SENATE COMMITTEE
ON FINANCE, 96th CONG., 1st Sess., MTN STUDIES I RESULTS FOR U.S. AGRICULTURE
(Comm. Print 1979) [hereinafter cited as MTN STUDIES].
4 MTN STUDIES, supra note 3, at 168.
5 Id.
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States was also the world's largest importer of unmanufactured leaf,6 the
international trade of tobacco has contributed to the reduction of the
U.S. balance of trade deficit. For example, in 1978 exports of leaf to-
bacco and tobacco products were valued at $2.1 billion and imports at
$428 million, creating a contribution of almost $1.7 billion. 7
U.S. tobacco exports are not faring as well as they had previously on
world markets, however. The quantity of U.S. exports has decreased
roughly seven million pounds per year,8 while the world export market
has nearly doubled.9 Moreover, although total U.S. exports to the Euro-
pean Community, the largest market for U.S. tobacco, have stayed about
the same, the U.S. share of the EC market has declined from an average
of thirty-four percent in 1965-69 to about twenty-three percent in 1979.10
The largest EC markets, Germany and the United Kingdom, have come
to absorb not only a decrease in the percentage of imports coming from
the United States but also a decrease in the total quantity. In particular,
the United Kingdom imported from the United States 165 million
pounds representing fifty percent of their total imports in 1968; in 1977,
that amount was down to 52 million pounds, only seventeen percent of
the U.K. market.'I The trend illustrated by these statistics may be par-
ticularly adverse to the North Carolina farmer of flue-cured tobacco.
One out of every two acres of flue-cured tobacco produced in the United
States is shipped overseas 12 and the U.S. share of world exports of flue-
cured tobacco has dropped from sixty percent in 1966 to thirty-two per-
cent in 1979.13
The decline in U.S. market share of world tobacco sales has been
attributed to several factors. One is the higher tar and nicotine levels in
the high quality U.S. leaf. Because of the worldwide shift to low tar and
nicotine brands, foreign manufacturers have been able to substitute
cheaper, lower quality tobacco to meet this new demand. 14 A second
factor is the use of less leaf per cigarette as manufacturers substitute
stems, scrap and other fillers and improve their technical utilization of
6 Id. at 169.
7 H. Kiger, Foreign Trade-Key to an Expanding Flue-Cured Tobacco Economy, at 3
(1979) (unpublished article for the Leaf Tobacco Exporter Association)(copy on file at the North
Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Rqgulation).
8 OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESI-
DENT, VIRGINIA BENEFITS OF THE MTN 1 (1979).
9 H. Kiger, supra note 7, at 4, Table 7 app. (citing ECONOMIc STATISTICS AND COOPERA-
TIVES SERVICE AND FOREIGN AGRIGULTURAL SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE).
10 MTN STUDIES, supra note 3, at 171.
11 H. Kiger, supra note 7, at 4, Table 8 app. (citing FOREIGN AGRICULTURAL SERVICE,
U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE).
12 H. Kiger; A More Open-Trading System for Tobacco, at 3 (Jan. 16, 1979) (unpublished
address to the 28th Tobacco Workers' Conference, Orlando, Florida).
13 H. Kiger, supra note 7, at 4, Table 7 app. (citing ECONOMIC STATISTICS AND COOPERA-
TIVES SERVICE AND FOREIGN AGRICULTURAL SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE).
14 H. Kiger, supra note 7, at 2-3. Domestic manufacturers have substituted cheaper, lower
quality tobacco as well, stimulating an increase in imports.
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tobacco.15 Nevertheless, by far the most cited reason for the decline is
the high price of U.S. tobacco, 16 one element of which has been the tariff.
For years foreign and domestic customers have been willing to pay the
premium required for U.S. leaf primarily because of its higher quality as
compared with foreign competition. Recently, however, the price sup-
port program designed to support producers by controlling production,
high labor costs, and tariff and nontariff restrictions have put U.S. export
prices well above the average prices of competing nations.' 7 In fact, the
price of U.S. flue-cured tobacco is approximately double the price of
such competing exporters as Brazil, South Korea, India and Thailand.'
The tariff imposed by the EC has proved to be an important ele-
ment in placing U.S. tobacco at a disadvantage. Much competition in
the flue-cured market comes from some of the less developed countries,
which not only enjoy much lower domestic labor costs but most of which
also benefit from either duty-free status or generalized tariff preference
rates granted by the EC. 19 In addition, other competition comes from
within the EC, in particular France and Italy which of course benefit
from the duty-free status as members.
II. Objectives of U.S. Tobacco Interests
In many ways, the actual conduct of Multilateral Trade Negotia-
tions with respect to agricultural products was an accomplishment. His-
torically, such negotiations have been kept to a minimum. Participating
nations, other than the United States, have continually argued that their
respective national and economic strength depends too greatly on their
agricultural policies and capabilities to subject agricultural products to
free trade.2 0 So strong have been these sentiments that, in the Kennedy
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations from 1963 to 1967, "members
of the EC viewed attempts to negotiate agricultural policy as a threat to
the EC itself.' '2 1 An additional problem is that most agricultural trading
countries are almost exclusively either exporters or importers of major
commodities. Thus, reaching agreement on "balanced" reductions is dif-
15 Id. at 2. Before manufacture, the tobacco leaf is sent through a "stripping" process by
which the leaf is extracted from the stem. Over the years this process has been improved so that
less leaf is lost, and thus the number of leaves per cigarette has declined.
16 MTN STUDIES, supra note 3, at 177-78.
17 Id. at 172. The thrust of the price support program is as follows: the USDA assigns
acreage-poundage allotments each year to tobacco farmers. Any tobacco grown under these
allotments qualified for the minimum price support, the level of which varies according to tex-
ture, position on stalk, color and other factors determined by USDA graders. In the warehouse
auction, any qualifying bundle of tobacco is either brought by the government at that mini-
mum level or by private companies at a higher level. In the last ten years the average price
support level has risen from 66.6 cents per pound in 1970 to $1.29 per pound in 1979, and an
increase is expected for the coming year. H. Kiger, supra note 7, at Table 9 app. &e U.S. DEP'T
OF AGRICULTURE, AGRICULTURAL STATISTICS, at Table 146 (1979).
t H. Kiger, supra note 7, at 7, Chart 2 app.
19 MTN STUDIES, supra note 3, at 171 (Table 12-111).
20 Id. at 4.
21 Id. at 9.
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ficult. 2 2
Despite historical precedent, the United States was determined to
include the agricultural sector in all Tokyo Round trade negotiations.
Although agricultural products were not to be subject to the general
tariff formula, the participants in the negotiations did agree that tariff
reductions would be negotiated bilaterally.2 3 Presented with this oppor-
tunity, the tobacco interests in the United States formed ambitious objec-
tives for the Tokyo Round, aimed primarily at the European
Community: first, a tariff reduction to at least the level of the U.S. duty
on tobacco imports;24 second, a phase-out of the duty-free status and
generalized tariff preference rates granted by the EC to the developing
countries; 2 5 third, the adoption by the EC of a predominantly specific
excise tax that would favor the sale of cigarettes made from high quality
leaf;2 6 and fourth, the elimination of export subsidies, auction sales for
export, and import safeguards practiced by the EC. 27 Also, tobacco ex-
porters sought tariff and nontariff concessions from other nations includ-
ing the Phillipines, Mexico, Brazil and Australia. 28
III. Effects of the Tokyo Round
The most significant concessions resulting from the Tokyo Round
which favored U.S. tobacco exports came from the European Commu-
nity, Australia and New Zealand. The EC granted the rough equivalent
of a nine cent per pound tariff reduction for the high-priced U.S. tobacco
only. 29 Lower priced, competitive tobaccos will have the same duties as
before. 30 Although this reduction falls five cents short of the U.S. objec-
tive, the Office of the Special Trade Representative [STR] expects U.S.
22 Id. at 4.
23 Graham, A vraaihtzner's Guide to the Tokyo Round Trade Negotsations, 4 N.C.J. INT'L L. &
COM. REG. 225, 232 n.26 (1979).
24 H. Kiger, U.S. Tobacco Trade Problems as Related to the Tokyo Round Trade Negoti-
ations, at I (1979)(unpublished article for the Leaf Tobacco Exporters Association). The U.S.
duty on flue-cured and burley is 12.75 cents per pound. Id. This objective represented a reduc-
tion of almost fourteen cents per pound. MTN STUDIES, supra note 3, at 174.
25 H. Kiger, U.S. Tobacco Trade Problems, supra note 24, at 1. Tobacco interests felt that
at least "[u]nder no circumstances should [these preferences] be expanded." Id.
26 Id. at 2. A specific tax is a flat rate per package; the current excise tax is ad valorem.
The United States sought an excise tax in which seventy-five percent of the total was a specific
tax. Id.
27 Id. These practices by the EC have been particularly adverse to U.S. tobacco exports.
"The high prices fixed under this policy-supported primarily by means of variable import
levies-have prevented effective price competition and forced third countries into the position
of residual suppliers. Furthermore, the Community has used export subsidies aggressively to
dispose of surpluses produced under the stimulus of its high support prices." MTN STUDIES,
supra note 3, at 5 (citing WILLIAMS COMMISSION, U.S. INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY IN
AN INTERDEPENDENT WORLD, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT SUBMITTED BY THE COMMISSION
ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT POLICY 141 (July 1971)).
28 H. Kiger, supra note 25, at 2.
29 MTN STUDIES, supra note 3, at 2.
30 Id.
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exports to increase by $75 million as a result of the concession. 3 1 How-
ever, a Senate subcommittee estimates that this increase will only offset
an otherwise annual decline and concludes that as EC consumption con-
tinues to increase, the U.S. share of that market will continue to de-
cline.
32
The Australian concessions came in two forms. Australia reduced
its duty on unmanufactured toabcco from sixty-four cents to twenty-four
cents per pound, and it reduced its mixing requirement to fifty percent.3 3
The mixing law, a nontariff barrier, requires that a minimum percentage
of cigarette content be Australian tobacco; Australian manufacturers
currently use fifty-six percent domestic tobacco.3 4 The Office of the STR
expects these concessions to increase U.S. exports by 7.7 million dollars a
year, 35 or 1.8 million pounds.36
Meanwhile, New Zealand reduced its duty from thirty-five to
nineteen cents per pound. 37 The full impact of this reduction will be
limited somewhat because of continued government pressure to use do-
mestic tobacco, but the United States expects an increase of .1 million
pounds worth .2 million dollars. 38
Thus, adding the concessions made by Finland, Canada and all
other participants to those made by the EC, Australia and New Zealand,
the total projected increase in U.S. tobacco exports at the end of the
transition period 39 is estimated to be between forty-eight 40 and fifty-
three million pounds,'4 worth between 78.642 and 86 million dollars.43
U.S. concessions, on the other hand, were minimal. Nineteen countries
requested concessions, but the United States granted only one, to Ca-




Certainly, the tariff and nontariff concessions will make U.S. to-
bacco more competitive than if the concessions had not been granted.
31 OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESI-
DENT, KENTUCKY BENEFITS OF THE MTN 7 (1979).
32 MTN STUDIES, supra note 3, at 164.
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, supra note 31, at 7.
36 MTN STUDIES, supra note 3, at 164.
37 Id.
38 Id. at 164-65.
39 The end of the transition period is 1987. MTN STUDIES, supra note 3, at 1.
40 MTN STUDIES, supra note 3, at 166.
41 OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, supra note 8, at 2.
42 MTN STUDIES, supra note 3, at 164.
43 OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, supra note 8, at 2.
44 MTN STUDIES, supra note 3, at 165.
45 Draft Report of the Agricultural Technical Advisory Committee for Tobacco on the
Multilateral Trade Negotiations Agreements (June 13, 1979).
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However, because of other factors, even the maintenance of current abso-
lute levels of exports is unlikely in the absence of other measures. First,
the average market price for U.S. flue-cured tobacco has increased by
thirty-five percent over the last three years, 46 and that trend is expected
to continue. If this rate of increase persists, the next annual jump in
support prices will cancel out the nine cent tariff reduction. 47
Second, although the U.S. tobacco interests sought to persuade the
EC to drop its preferential treatment of developing countries, this objec-
tive was unrealistic. The United States itself grants and sanctions the
preferential treatment of less developed countries and, thus, cannot com-
plain when the policy stimulates adverse competition.
A third discouraging factor is the return of Rhodesia into the world
market following the lifting of U.N. sanctions. Prior to the sanctions,
Rhodesia was second only to the United States as the largest exporter of
flue-cured tobacco.48 Because of the high labor requirements for today's
tobacco production, Rhodesia, like many of the developing countries, has
a comparative advantage over the United States in production costs.
Add to this the duty-free status granted by the EC, and Rhodesia threat-
ens considerable price competition for U.S. toabcco.
As mentioned earlier, a Senate subcommittee has estimated that the
tariff reduction could at best allow the United States to maintain its cur-
rent absolute level of exports to the EC. An even more discouraging pos-
sibility is that the concessions will have no impact whatsoever. Because
prices for high-quality U.S. tobacco have been so high for a number of
years, manufacturers throughout the world have been delicately and
gradually reducing the quality of cigarettes, without much notice from
consumers. 49 Having achieved consumer acceptance of this lower quali-
ty cigarette, manufacturers will be even less willing to alter their blends
to reincorporate the most "competitive" but still highly priced American
leaf.5 0 The result may be a continued substantial annual decline in the
quantity of U.S. tobacco exports world-wide, as foreign competitors con-
tinue to increase their share of the world market.
The concessions achieved by the Tokyo Round of the Multilateral
Trade Negotiations may not reverse or halt the steady decline in the U.S.
share of either world or EC markets. Nevertheless, the agreements
reached in the Tokyo Round have eliminated tariff barriers as one of the
major obstacles to the sale of U.S. tobacco on world markets. Attention
46 U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, TOBACCO SITUATION, at Table 141 (1978).
47 See note 17, supra-.
48 Guyon, Return of Rhodesian Tobacco to Markets Blows Smoke over US Exporters'Hopes, Wall
St. J., Feb. 14, 1980, at 38, col. 2.
49 MTN STUDIES, supra note 3, at 178.
0 Id.
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can now focus on other factors affecting the competitiveness of U.S. to-
bacco in international trade.
-HAYNES PELL LEA

